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A B S T R A C T :  Some  of  the  clinical and  theo re t i ca l  issues t h o u g h t  to  be  involved 
in the  psycho logy  of  " r e p l a c e m e n t  ch i ld ren"  are discussed. A d e v e l o p m e n t a l  
f r a m e w o r k  is p roposed  wi th in  wh ich  to  view such chi ldren.  The  r e p l a c e m e n t  
child is b e c o m i n g  an  ident i f iab le  clinical s y n d r o m e ,  and  a d e v e l o p m e n t a l  f rame-  
work  is sorely needed  to  encourage  more  sys temat i c  research.  A r e p l a c e m e n t  
chi ld perceives his s ta tus  d i f f e ren t ly  on  b o t h  a cogni t ive  and  e m o t i o n a l  level 
w i th in  the  c o n t e x t  of  each deve lopmen ta l  phase,  and  the  af fec t ive  and  associa- 
tive l inks need  to  be r eworked  each t ime.  We view the  s ta tus  of  be ing  a replace- 
m e n t  child as a deve lopmen ta l  i n t e r f e rence  insofar  as d e m a n d s  are p laced  on  t he  
chi ld ' s  i m m a t u r e  ego which  he  migh t  no t  ye t  be  equ ipped  to  cope  wi th .  
When a child has died, the  parents  somet imes  a t t e m p t  to  assuage 
thei r  pain and suffer ing over  the  loss by  ra ther  quickly  conceiving a 
new infant  or start ing adop t i on  proceedings.  The  new infant ' s  en t ry  
into the  fami ly  may  in te r rup t ,  d is tor t ,  and delay the  mourn ing  proc-  
ess bu t  c a nno t  resolve it, even though  the  expec ta t ions  once  held for  
the  dead child are now t ransfer red  to  a live one.  For  the  child the  sit- 
ua t ion  is haza rdous - -no t  on ly  does  he have to  begin life in an ambi- 
ence  of  parenta l  mourn ing ,  bu t  moreove r  as he grows he has to  estab- 
lish self- ident i ty  in the  shadow of  a n o t h e r  iden t i ty  p ro jec t ed  o n t o  
him via the  family  my th .  
We would  like to  discuss, in a pre l iminary  way,  some of  the  clini- 
cal and theore t ica l  issues tha t  we believe may  be involved in the  psy- 
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cho logy  of  rep lacement  children. Our  discussion is based on direct  
clinical exper ience with on ly  one such latency-age child and,  hence,  
is d rawn more  generally f rom our  knowledge  a b o u t  psychological  de- 
ve lopment  and the tasks faced  by  children as t hey  proceed  th rough  
the deve lopmenta l  stages. We believe tha t  it is helpful  to fo rmula te  a 
prel iminary deve lopmenta l  f r amework  within which  to view such chil- 
dren,  even if it is based on l imited clinical in-depth experience,  inso- 
far as it might  s t imulate  the required more  sys temat ic  col lect ion o f  
data,  which in tu rn  will permit  us to refine our  conceptual iza t ions .  It  
is our  impression tha t  more  clinicians are becoming  aware o f  an iden- 
tifiable clinical en t i ty  k n o w n  as the  " r ep l acemen t  chi ld"  bu t  tha t  
these impressions lack a deve lopmenta l  f r amework  f rom which  more  
systemat ic  explora t ion  can proceed.  
We can speak of  rep lacement  as being a deve lopmenta l  interfer-  
ence;  tha t  is to  say, it is an external  and envi ronmenta l  in terference 
impinging usually adversely on the child and making  demands  which 
the ego has no t  ye t  the capaci ty  to cope with. The fact  of  having re- 
placed a dead child will be perceived di f ferent ly  and have a changing 
significance b o t h  cognit ively and emot iona l ly  as the  child matures ,  
and the affectual  and associative links have to  be reworked  in the 
con t e x t  of  each progression.  When adap ta t ion  has been poor ly  made  
during earlier stages, the rep lacement  child is likely to  be vulnerable 
and at risk dur ing adolescence,  as was the case wi th  one intelligent 
16-year-old girl.* 
A. was admitted to the hospital for investigation of a pneumonia that had per- 
sisted for 9 months. The parents spoke of accident proneness and self-mutilating 
tendencies. Two years previously when a broken leg had been casted, there had 
been complications because of skin lesions under the cast, thought to have been 
self-induced by the introduction of a foreign substance. This and other incidents 
led to the request for a psychiatric consultation whereupon the complicating fac- 
tor of a typical replacement syndrome was uncovered. The patient was the young- 
est in a family of five, an acknowledged replacement for the middle child who 
had died at age 3 years (prior to the conception of the patient), presumably a 
case of sudden death syndrome. The significant fact for the father was that res- 
piratory arrest occurred shortly after a severe verbal admonishment from him 
and her being put in her crib and left alone in the bedroom. She was a child who 
had a history of breath holding when frustrated. When A. was born, she bore a 
strong resemblance to the dead child, and father said it was as if the dead child 
had come back to give him a second chance, and he would do anything to take 
care of her. 
*The authors wish to thank D. Trivedi, MD, for bringing this example to their 
attention. 
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Replacement  children have received very little direct a t tent ion in 
the literature. Cain and Cain [1] discuss a series of six children re- 
ferred for psychiatric evaluation, all of  whom had replaced a sibling 
dying in latency or early adolescence. They  observe such children to 
be interested in the topic of  death and of naturally occurring catas- 
trophes. Discussing the identi ty problems those children had, the au- 
thors note the relative absence of  a sense of  individuality, insofar as 
the parents ambivalently tried to t ransform them into replicas of 
their dead children. 
Poznanski [2] describes the case of  a 15-year-old girl with "depres- 
sions, a suicide a t tempt ,  nightmares of  death and dying and the ac- 
quisition of  a boyfr iend who a t tempted to kill her."  This girl had 
been conceived 2 months after the death of  a 5-year-old sister who, 
according to the family myth ,  had predicted her own death and re- 
placement.  The literature appears not  to have many specific refer- 
ences to cases in which the dead child died in infancy, ye t  this would 
seem to be a significant variable influencing the clinical picture. To 
substitute for a child who reached 5 or more year of life entails a 
steady progression toward a feared anniversary age with increasing 
awareness and growing comprehension of  the reality of  death. Never- 
theless, until that  anniversary is passed there is a historical real child 
to identify with as well as the distorted and idealized parental memo- 
ry. In contrast  to this, when the dead child did not  survive infancy, 
the replacement child has passed the crucial age of his predecessor 
before becoming aware of the facts. The replacement  for  an infant  
death does not  have even for a few years the historical "real child" to 
identify with. By the time he has reached an awareness of his replace- 
ment  status there is only the family myth,  fantasies, and expecta- 
tions held by the parents that  have never been actualized by a live 
child of his own age. It should not  surprise us if these children show 
a peculiar quality of  detachment ,  aloofness, and feyness and have 
even greater difficulty in building up a sense of  self-identify. 
When such children are genetically well endowed they may be gift- 
ed, creative artists, as for example in the case of Beethoven and van 
Gogh, but with only a fragile and tentative hold on life. Most biogra- 
phers of Beethoven are somewhat silent about  his early life. The first 
child born to Beethoven's parents, called Ludwig after a grandfather,  
died in infancy. Beethoven, born a year or so later, was given the 
dead infant 's name, and it seems very probable that  he was to some 
extent  a replacement child. In van Gogh's case his letters to Theopil- 
lus and a psychoanalytic study made by Nagera [3] provide a clear 
picture of replacement  as a developmental  interference. 
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Replacement  as a Developmental Interference 
When we study the files of those replacement children for whom 
psychiatric evaluation and help have been sought, a picture emerges 
of children who walk in the shadow of death. One adopted replace- 
ment  child who was referred for psychiatric evaluation in prelatency 
because he was considered dangerous to himself and others had a his- 
tory  of  being afraid of ghosts and spooks. He told the examining phy- 
sician, "Caspar spares mothers  but  not  little boys. Ghosts scare me, 
they can kill you.  They are mean and can kill you  with a knife and 
cut you into little pieces." 
Cain and Cain [ 1 ] comment  on the preexisting pathology of  those 
parents who, unable to tolerate and withstand the painful process of 
mourning a dead child, take a flight into new parenthood.  It  is not  
our present purpose to inquire into the antecedents of such a deci- 
sion but rather to examine the consequences for the new child. It 
seems to us that  such an examination has a certain timeliness, for as 
more parents restrict the size of their family, in accordance with pres- 
ent trends, there seems to be an increased probabili ty that  an inten- 
tional replacement  child may be planned whenever a child dies. It is 
our position that  in order for such a child to have a possibility of be- 
coming a person in his own right there should be an appropriate lapse 
of time between the death and either concept ion or the start of  adop- 
tion proceedings for a new child. The more common practice of ex- 
pediting replacement may not  be in the best interests of  those most  
closely concerned. In the many interfaces between psychiatry and 
other  medical specialties, especially pediatrics and obstetrics, there 
is an oppor tun i ty  for  preventive psychiatry in this respect. But if we 
are to convince others, we first have to be clear ourselves about  the 
obstacles and stumbling blocks that  a replacement status puts in a 
child's path causing detours f rom normal development.  
Perhaps the circumstance of  life most  nearly analogous to that  of 
the replacement child is the experience of being a twin. Reviewing 
the literature, Joseph and Tabor  [4: p. 276] note  that  various authors 
found that  "being a member  of  a twin pair (either fraternal or identi- 
cal) had profound effects on personality development.  By and large 
there is a mutual  interdependency and failure completely to differen- 
tiate one's self from the twin, so that  a complete self representat ion 
is not  found."  The "twinning react ion" results in a fusion of self- and 
object representations. The consequences are disturbances in ego 
boundary and identi ty for  the twin. It may be that  a replacement 
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child often may have the experience of being ambivalently tied to 
the "dead chi ld" and that his situation vis-a-vis the dead child is like- 
ly to bring about  difficulties similar to those just described. More- 
over, the profound effect of  guilt tha t  may stem from being a replace- 
ment  child should not  be overlooked--his predecessor had to die in 
order for him to have been either conceived or adopted.  Although 
consciously and intellectually the replacement child may recognize 
that  he is not  responsible for his predecessor's death, it can be hy- 
pothesized that  at some level and probably unconsciously some of  
the "psychology of survivorship" may be operating. It can fur ther  be 
inferred that  a substantial degree of  existential anxiety,  a sense of  the 
finiteness of things, will be experienced due to feelings that are asso- 
ciated to the dead child, a sense of  " there  but  for the grace of God 
go I." The identification with the dead child would encourage such 
an att i tude. In terms of character traits, in our limited clinical expe- 
rience with a replacement child, it can lead to impetuousness, pleas- 
ure seeking, here-and-now gratification, and a sense that  fate and 
chance govern life. 
If we look closely at the developmental  sequences as they  should 
unfold in the 1st year of life, it becomes apparent that a number  of 
crucial developmental  tasks are significantly vulnerable to the inter- 
ference of  the replacement status and its accompanying phenomena.  
It can be seen that  the experience of being received into a grieving 
family and, as it were, handed a prefabricated identi ty,  not  one's 
own, represents a massive insult to early developmental  processes, 
and this even when the congenital equipment,  the genetic heritage, 
and irreversible perinatal influences show excellent potential  for  
healthy development.  
Anna Freud [5] describes the first 3 months  of  life as the stage of  
biological unity between the mother  and infant couple. It is also a 
"relationship of adaptiveness." Hartmann [6: pp. 51-52] points out  
that  " the  newborn is in close touch with his environment  not  only 
by his need for its cont inuous care, but  also by his reactions to its 
stimuli, though of  course these reactions are of ten not  at first speci- 
fically adapted."  The mutual i ty  between mother  and infant,  which 
represents a developmental  achievement for  the infant, is based on 
his own genetic endowment  and on the mother ' s  at t i tude toward 
him, described by Winnicott [7: p. 250] as "her  capacity to make 
real what the baby is ready to reach out  for, to discover or to create"; 
the main thing is the communicat ion between the baby and mother  
in terms of ana tomy and physiology of live bodies. How primitive 
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and rudimentary this dialogue is and how dependent  on the mother 's  
sensitivity to the infant's cues and her role as an auxiliary ego are 
highlighted by Spitz [8].  
In one of his earliest writings Sigmund Freud [9] addresses him- 
self to the topic of stimuli coming from the inside and the role these 
play in initiating dialogue. As a result of stimuli originating inside the 
body, as, for instance, hunger, the infant experiences tension that  
can be removed only through a change in the outside world. The in- 
fant can only discharge, not permanently relieve, his tension by ran- 
dom movements, screaming, and the like. The outside help that  is ne- 
cessary is activated by the infant 's behavior. Freud [9: p. 318] points 
out that  "this path of discharge thus acquires a secondary funct ion 
of the highest importance, that  of  communication." The replacement 
child may have a harder than usual time in bringing about an under- 
standing with the two most important  people in his life, namely, his 
grieving parents. Sander [10] recognizes that  the earliest interactions 
between mother  and neonate bring about the initial adjustment and 
the formation of a "first regulatory stability" regarding the rhythms 
of feeding, elimination, sleeping, and waking. We wonder if mothers 
of replacement children may have difficulty responding to the rhythms 
of the new infant and try to impose the pattern of the dead infant. 
One mother  described herself a sa t  a loss to understand the new baby; 
she enumerated the differences between the new baby and the infant 
who had lived for only a few months--it  was clear that  she watched 
carefully for behavior in any way reminiscent of the dead infant. 
Such behavior, while consciously painful to her, nevertheless brought 
her quickest response. From the earliest months the behavior that  is 
reinforced, by receiving the most parental at tention,  is likely to be 
behavior in some way reminiscent of the dead child. The reciprocity 
being built up between mother  and infant may lack the spontaneity 
of a unique new relationship, for interposed between the mother  and 
the new infant will be the shadow of the other child now and always. 
Behavior that  is an any way reminiscent of the dead child may give 
rise to anxiety or grief, while behavior not like that  of the other child 
may not be experienced positively by the mother either. 
PoIsby [11] broadens the term replacement to include those adopt- 
ed children who replace the wished-for as well as the actually con- 
ceived child. One sees adoptive parents who are disappointed in their 
adopted children because of  their failure to live up to the fantasied 
image of the ideal biological child. This causes the parents difficulties 
in detaching themselves from the imagined biological child and at- 
taching themselves emotionally to the adopted child. In one such case, 
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the adoptive parents hoped for a child who would have fit their tem- 
perament and personality, which essentially was reflective and social- 
ly conservative. Instead their adopted child was action oriented and 
socially less restrained. This "mismatch" 'caused difficulties for the 
parents in terms of their inability to mourn the fantasied ideal bio- 
logical child. In a similar vein, Deutsch [12],  speaking of adoptions 
that  are planned to replace an actual loss, states that  "of ten  the adop- 
tion represents an at tempt  to interrupt the mourning violently--a mis- 
take that  is usually followed by bad consequences." She finds that  
" the  child adopted as a comforter has very poor chances of  conquer- 
ing the mother 's  hear t"  [12: p. 415].  
As the replacement baby becomes more responsive to the mother,  
it may not be uncommon for her to withdraw from him. The parents, 
finding that  the new infant has done little to resolve their grief, and 
that  his presence has become conflictual for them, may retreat to ac- 
tivities outside the home, often becoming considerably involved in 
these. When this takes place in the second quarter of the infant 's 1st 
year, it will coincide with the libidinal position of the narcissistic 
stage. The infant is now entering upon a need-fulfilling or anaclitic 
relationship with the mother, which, as Anna Freud [5: p. 65] points 
out,  "is based upon the urgency of the infant 's body needs and drive 
derivatives, is intermittent  and fluctuating, since object cathexis is 
sent out under the impact of imperative desires and withdrawn again 
when satisfaction has been reached." The mother  is perceived only in 
terms of her function as satisfier of the infant 's needs. When the ob- 
ject, that is, the mother,  is desired in and of herself, the stage of need 
satisfaction is left, and the beginnings of object constancy appear. 
The need-fulfilling stage corresponds with Mahler's symbiotic phase 
during which the infant depends upon the auxiliary ego, that  is, moth- 
er, to serve as a protective shield. When the mother  is unavailable to 
serve as a protective shield, and according to the degree of her una- 
vailability, cumulative trauma may occur and lead to ego distortion 
during the early phases of ego differentiation [ 13].  
The 3rd to 6th months, the stage of need satisfaction in Anna 
Freud's terms, and of symbiosis between mother  and infant in Mahl- 
er's, coincide with the libidinal position of primary narcissism [14].  
When the psychological environment is impoverished during these 
months,  development proceeds against heavy odds. In order to sus- 
tain a minimum of the necessary positive narcissistic feelings at this 
time,when the infant requires the caretaking adult partner as a pro- 
vider of physical necessities and psychological warmth,  the appropri- 
ate interaction between mother and infant makes possible the infant 's 
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libidinal development, the unfolding of the ego, and the expanding 
of object relationships. The maternal cathexis toward the replace- 
ment infant, however, is likely to be distorted by grief, guilt, longing, 
and fears that  offer interferences with the maternal pleasure in and 
acceptance of the infant as a unique organism. It is unlikely that the 
mother and infant will be able to experience a sufficiently rich and 
mutually rewarding symbiosis in preparation for the next libidinal 
position, that  of object love in which the tasks of differentiation and 
individuation, leading to a stable sense of identity or self-constancy, 
have to be begun by the infant. When the earlier need for involve- 
ment and symbiosis has not  been sufficiently satisfied, immature 
clinging to the object may alternate with too great a detachment  
from it. 
Kohut  [15: p. 215] discusses the developmental steps from the 
earliest libidinal position of autoerotism to the next position, that  of 
primary narcissism as "a move toward increased synthesis of the per- 
sonality due to a shift from the libidinal cathexis of individual body 
parts, or of isolated physical or mental functions to a cathexis of a 
cohesive self." Although at first this self will be grandiose, exhibition- 
istic, and unreliable, nevertheless, "the nuclei of the body self and of 
the mental self coalesce and form a superordinate unit ." Kohut  sug- 
gests that  transmuting internalization of the mother 's  basic soothing 
and calming activities results when the child experiences an optimal 
amount  of frustration. When the mother proves to be grossly unem- 
pathic the  child clings to an archaic "uncondit ional  perfection." 
The infant then fails to develop certain internal functions that  en- 
able him to reestablish the narcissistic equilibrium through either self- 
soothing or an appropriate appeal to the idealized parent. Depending, 
among other factors, on the extensiveness of the mother 's faul ty re- 
sponse, there will be a hypersensitivity to disturbances in narcissistic 
equilibrium, with a tendency to react to sources of narcissistic dis- 
turbance by mixtures of wholesale withdrawal and unforgiving rage 
[15: p. 65].  Often because the mother is still grieving the lost child, 
her preoccupation precludes intuitive and empathic response to the 
replacement child and exceeds an optimally frustrating level. Kohut  
writes that  " the  small child, for example, invests other people with 
narcissistic cathexis and thus experiences them narcissistically, i.e., as 
self-objects. The expected control over such others is then closer to 
the concept of the control which a grownup expects to have over his 
own body and mind than to the concept of the control which he ex- 
pects to have over others" [15: p. 26]. It seems that with replace- 
ment children this does not become modified in later stages, and at 
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7 or 8 they may still tyrannize over their objects in this way. It be- 
comes almost a fight for survival, control of the object representing 
safety for the child. 
From the fourth quarter of the 1st year the increasing motor  skills 
allow the child to gain in autonomy;  he can now make some decisions 
for himself, he can move away from, and back toward, the mother. 
The interferences in the earlier months may be reflected now in a too 
great disregard for mother  and a tendency to wander out  of her sight 
or by a clinging and not  being able to leave her side. Anna Freud [16: 
p. 16] writes of situations where " the  looseness and breaking of the 
emotional tie originate with the child, not  with the parents." Such 
children's capacity for object love may be "underdeveloped for either 
internal or external, innate or acquired reasons." She points out that  
"this defect may become manifest in the symptoms of early wander- 
ing, frequently getting lost, truanting, etc. In these instances, the chil- 
dren do not  accuse other people [of losing them] nor do they feel 
guilty themselves." This behavior has frequently been displayed by 
one patient, and we would expect it to be not  uncommon among re- 
placement children. 
As the child grows into the 2nd year, the problem of separation- 
individuation increases for the mother,  who, having lost one child, 
may tend to be overprotective, oversolicitous, and overrestrictive in 
her attitude. 
Together with the hypersensitivity to disturbances in zmrcissistic 
equilibrium we find in these children a marked lack of cathexis of 
their own bodies [2].  The qualitiative lack in the object relationship 
has reacted adversely against investment of cathexis of their own 
bodies, thus enhancing the danger of self-destructive behavior. These 
children seem at times, as they grow older, to treat their bodies as ex- 
pendable and to lack sufficiently strong ego attributes of self-preser- 
vation. They are from all aspects children at risk occuping a space 
that  has a quality of otherness. 
This quality of otherness may have a bearing upon certain identifi- 
cations the young replacement child builds up. Freud has referred to 
the at tainment of the position of esteem held by the object, as a mo- 
tive for identification; for replacement children the object whose po- 
sition of esteem they envy is the dead child. A complicating circum- 
stance not  to be overlooked is the conceptual gap that  will exist for 
several years between an understanding of the dead child as an object 
of parental esteem and an ability to conceptualize death as a final 
state of no return. Identifications with the dead child probably are 
built up subtly, starting before there is comprehension of the other 's 
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existence. It was noted earlier that  the mothers of these children tend 
to reinforce behavior reminiscent of  the dead child; it seems this gives 
a first impetus to what will come. Schecter [17: p. 66] discusses the 
link Spitz made between Piaget's conceptualization of stages of imi- 
tation and the infant 's mirroring parental gestures. "The imitations 
occur in the course of the unfolding object relations mostly in games" 
and become "placed into the service of the child's spontaneous ac- 
tions and games even in the absence of  the adult." Spitz considers 
such interiorized imitations as evidence of identification proper since 
there is a modification of the ego's structure based on the perception 
and memory of actions observed in the libidinal object. Spitz [18: p. 
394] comments that  these early identifications are used for object 
relations and mastery, for defense, and attack. 
We wonder if the games played with the replacement child are like- 
ly to be repetitions of games parents once shared with the dead child 
either in actuality or fantasy; which it is does not matter so much as 
does the at t i tude of  the playing parent, and a psychological distance 
coming between adult and child as the play evokes for the parent a 
fantasy of playing with the other child. Thus the child has a model 
for "no t  being present." An early identification with this pattern of 
behavior may later become the behavior described by the mother  of 
one replacement child: "He walks through the room as though it 
were empty,  just drifts through without  seeing us." The parent of a 
replacement child is inevitably in conflict; on the one hand, there is 
overinvestment in the replacement child as just that, while on the 
other hand, such a child is a constant reminder of the dead child, and 
the parent may therefore unconsciously wish him dead too, an atti- 
tude that  the replacement child may sense and identify with. 
As the child moves through the toddler years, it is expected that 
his imitative play will help him to build up identifications that  will 
prepare him to take his place outside the home. Schecter [17] writ- 
ing of identification and individuation, notes that  "identifications 
function as organizing structures in which the mastery of relatively 
autonomous ego functions (e.g., motility, speech,-cognition) can join 
forces with attempts at mastery of emotionally laden conflicts." The 
need to give up the symbiotic mother  and the resulting experience of 
loss and frustration tend in normal circumstances to push the child 
forward to higher levels of identification, but when the symbiotic 
partnership has never progressed to a satisfactory dialogue it cannot 
be given up. One replacement child's solution was to move away from 
people and to identify with dogs and animals; though present, identi- 
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fications with people were tenuous. The replacement child is caught 
in a dilemma, for he is not  likely to have a mother  who can reliably 
be present for him, who can be experienced as specifically his emo- 
tional nurturance.  The mother  may indeed be reliably present,  may 
indeed be the source of supplies, yet  the child will experience depri- 
v a t i o n - t h e  cathexis accompanying the parenting is directed toward 
another  child, toward a painful memory ,  and things are done for him 
and to him as if he were another  child. It is not  his self but  another 's  
that  is cherished. His primary objects respond to him "as i f"  he were 
another,  and in turn he starts behaving "as i f"  he were the other.  A 
reciprocal re inforcement  begins with parents and child becoming 
locked into a pseudoreality.  
Schecter [17: pp. 74-75] speaks of "magical a t tempts  to fulfill the 
ideal" that  one sees in the inauthentic identification of  "as if"  per- 
sonalities. This aptly describes one replacement  child's many and var- 
ied at tempts to take on the identi ty of  another.  For  many months  he 
refused to stay as himself during therapy sessions but  presented his 
therapist with a parade of  characters who came in fleetingly one af- 
ter the other  but  who could seldom be engaged in meaningful dia- 
logue or persuaded to stay. This constant  trying on of pseudoidenti- 
fications with a curious de tachment  from reality and of ten  exaggerat- 
ed speech and mannerisms was a poignantly clear reenactment  of the 
dilemma of this replacement  child who is also an adoptee.  The re- 
placement child's self-identity is jeopardized because parents tend to  
impose on him a dead child's identi ty;  the adoptee's sense of  self is 
threatened by the very fact of not  knowing his biological origins. 
Nevertheless, in our limited experience, it is impressive that  where 
both  variables are present the factor of being cast in a substitute role 
for a dead child appears to be the incisive factor  in pathology.  
Schecter [17: p. 75] raises the question as to whether  pseudoiden- 
tifications can in any way lead to the same ou tcome of  normal iden- 
tification processes that  results in an alteration of the self and in- 
creasingly differentiated psychic structure,  while at the same time 
permitting the self to retain the "basic con t inu i ty"  of  its own identi- 
ty.  Schecter draws an analogy from embryology remarking that  " in  
order for tissue to be plastic and susceptible to taking on the form of 
inductive tissues it must be in a state of  relative undifferent iat ion."  
He asks whether  " the  de-differentiation of aspects of  the self that  oc- 
curs during the various forms of ' a t tachment '  with the love object  
represent a similarly 'plastic' precondit ion for the initial stages of  
identification . . . .  ( 'Before I can become like you  in this way, I must  
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experience being you ' ) "  [17: p. 75]. We would agree that  this may 
imply a temporary blurring of the boundaries of self and object in 
the service of further growth and differentiation. 
The above conceptualization of the normal process of identifica- 
tion helps us to understand the pull toward the otherness of death in 
prelatency replacement children and yet  their" fear of it when hurt. 
One boy, referred to earlier, twice endured pain and hurt through 
self-destructive acts and each time greeted his rescuer with an out- 
burst of tears and sobbing that  he didn't want to die. If, as Schecter 
proposed, "before I can be like you in this way, I must experience 
being you in this way," then in order to win the parents' esteem 
through identity with the dead child it is necessary first to experi- 
ence being dead, yet  this experiencing being dead is meant to lead to 
an identity that  will sustain life. The conflict between living and dy- 
ing is enhanced by the young child's partial concept of death. 
The replacement child seems often to be so burdened with a search 
for a living and livable identity that  he has neither time nor freedom 
for age-appropriate play. This, of course, is a gross oversimplification, 
but predictably the prelatency replacement child is not free to enter 
into age-appropriate levels of peer play. Freud [19] introduced the 
term repetition compulsion to describe the child's inner pressure to 
repeat unmastered experiences. Greenacre [20: p. 63] thinks "we 
might more accurately speak of repetitive tendencies of which the re- 
petition compulsion is one form." Greenacre [20: pp. 65-66] reminds 
us of how play is driven by an inner maturational push to grow and a 
psychological wish that  exerts a pull to grow up. Since the young re- 
placement child is conflicted over growing up, he is not  likely to par- 
ticipate in play arranged with this theme in mind. He may often not 
be able to anticipate a long-range future for himself, nor is he helped 
by the possibility that,  as Greenacre [20: p. 66] says, "play may ap- 
pear as a paradoxical kind of make believe reality testing, in which 
the child holds the joker through the fact that  much of play is make 
believe even when expressed in overt action. It is not  then 'real reali- 
ty.' " 
In the case of one replacement child, it was not until he was 8 years 
old that  he could tell the therapist about "different  kinds of being 
real," implicitly appreciating the difference between pretense and re- 
ality. A model Christmas tree he had made was a real one--but when 
they got the tree with leaves at home, that would be a different kind 
of real, and a tree outside with roots in the earth would be still an- 
other kind of real. Much of the play behavior of this replacement 
child is solitary or in terms of a one-to-one encounter with another 
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person.  For  the  rep lacement  child, the  real i ty of  his own  ident i ty  can- 
no t  be used as a reference po in t  f r o m  which  he can securely partici- 
pate in the  make-believe reali ty test ing of  play,  in Greenacre 's  sense. 
Not  a lot  is k n o w n  abou t  van Gogh 's  manner  of  playing. Nonethe-  
less, some remarks  made  by Greenacre  [21:  pp. 626-627]  concern ing  
ident i ty  are relevant.  She suggests tha t  for  artists par t icular ly  there  is 
an instabil i ty of  ident i ty  because of  their  peculiar  con tex tua l  rela- 
t ionship to  their  surroundings,  their sense of  mult iple  identit ies,  and  
so for th .  Therefore ,  we may  assume tha t  the  status o f  r ep lacement  
child sits wi th  ex t raord inary  heaviness on a part icular ly gif ted or sen- 
sitive child. 
What we have a t t e m p t e d  in the above is to  t race the  unfo ld ing  of  
early deve lopment ,  interweaving wha t  we infer and wha t  we observed,  
albeit in a l imited way,  to  be the peculiar deve lopmenta l  obstacles  
tha t  a r ep lacement  child and parents  are faced wi th  in the  passage of  
the child t h rough  successive deve lopmenta l  stages on the  way  to  for- 
ma t ion  o f  a consol ida ted  ident i ty .  If  the above deve lopmenta l  foun-  
dat ions serve as a spr ingboard for more  sys temat ic  investigations,  
then  we have achieved our  aim. 
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